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BOOK REVIEWS__________________________________

In this issue, we are excited to bring you two reviews that are different from
the book reviews we typically publish. The first is an in-depth review by
Jeffrey B. Morris and Shari G. Newman of The Judge in a Democracy, a
timely book by Aharon Barak, the recently retired President of the Israeli
Supreme Court and a world-renowned jurist. The second is a review of a new
database by Oxford University Press called “International Law in Domestic
Courts.” This important new database will undoubtedly become an essential
research tool. In the future, we hope to publish more in-depth reviews and
more reviews of electronic resources. Enjoy!
Thomas Mills, Book Review Editor
Research Attorney
Cornell Law Library

Legal Aspects of the Cyprus Problem: Annan Plan and EU Accession. By
Frank Hoffmeister. Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2006.
Pp. ix, 289. ISBN 90-04-15223-7. €95.00; US$124.00.
Legal Aspects of the Cyprus Problem: Annan Plan and EU Accession
is a concise discussion of a multi-faceted deadlock that has been ongoing for
over three decades. Frank Hoffmeister sheds new light on this international
spectacle, which has involved a growing number of parties since the European
Union’s rise. The Cyprus problem indeed has been written about for decades
as the situation has developed and become more complex. The legal aspects
alone have occupied the research and discussion of international lawyers,
politicians, and academicians alike.
As is the case with every dispute, in the Cyprus issue there are at least
two sides to consider. Hoffmeister sincerely attempts to address the position
of all concerned parties; however, the UN position, or more specifically the
Annan Plan(s),390 seems to hold the favored position throughout the text.391
As the subtitle suggests, the Annan Plan comes to the forefront of the
390

There have been five versions between 2002 and 2004 but collectively they are
referred to as the Annan Plan.
391
See, for example, The Annan Plan for Cyprus available online
http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/
164
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discussion and legal analysis more often than the position of other parties.
Given Hoffmeister’s credentials, this is not surprising. He was after all the
EU expert seconded to the UN for the preparation of the latest version of the
Annan plan and an official at the Cyprus desk at Directorate-General on
Enlargement of the European Commission. Although this book is not official
or semi-official, as the author clearly states, it is based on his experience
dealing with the Cyprus problem. This is not stated to take away from the
legal analysis. Indeed, Hoffmeister provides a notable assessment of the legal
dilemma and brings the reader up to date with the current situation.
In fewer than three hundred pages, the author has sketched a rough
anatomy of the Cyprus problem for the novice reader. The extensive
footnotes are accompanied by appendices, containing a few of the referenced
legal doctrines, followed by an impressive bibliography and a scant index.
The chronological arrangement of topics and a further division of each
chapter into facts and legal analysis offers a polished presentation and a
pleasant read. In particular, the historical discussion of the relations between
the parties involved is noteworthy and necessary for the legal analysis of each
stage. The delicate brokering of the UN and the EU is integrated seamlessly
into the discussion throughout the text. The author is successful in
condensing the facts and rendering the legal application. Excluded from this
text are “geostrategic interests of the actors involved, negotiation tactics [and]
the political interaction of their steps.” However, these are addressed
selectively to give a reasonable account of the state of affairs.
This title would be a valuable addition to any international law
collection and a fine beginning into developing an understanding of the legal
aspects of the Cyprus problem.
Aslihan Bulut
Reference Librarian
Arthur W. Diamond Law Library
Columbia University School of Law
New York, NY USA
EU Administrative Governance. Edited by Herwig C.H. Hofmann and
Alexander H. Türk. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited,
2006. Pp. viii, 622. ISBN 1-84542-285-6. £95.00; US$160.00.
This book is a detailed illustration of European Union’s (EU)
complex, multi-level administrative governance system. It is a compilation of
multiple chapters written as individual essays by various European and
American legal scholars, legal practitioners, and political scientists. The key
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to this collection of essays is the highlighted cooperation among
administrators in Europe that has become the backbone of the EU’s unique
system of government and governance. The book is divided into three main
areas: Part I (Policy Process) contains three chapters; Part II (Sectoral Areas)
contains eight chapters; and Part III (Cross-Sectional Analysis) contains five
chapters as well as a conclusion chapter. Each chapter is well cited,
illustrated, and followed by a useful bibliography.
Chapter 1 focuses on the several administrative and institutional
ambiguities presented by the EU. Most notably, the focus is on the EU’s mix
of national, functional, and supranational governance dynamics. Particular
emphasis has been put on how the European Commission controls and polices
expert groups in order to influence and manage the policy-making agenda.
Using small and large expert groups to set the Commission agenda has
activated the dynamics of instrumental rationality and path dependency.
These expert groups are used as arenas for deliberation, brainstorming, and
intergovernmental conflict solving. This is where complex technical
problems are solved, according to the authors of this chapter. As a final note,
the chapter challenges the current intergovernmental divide in European
integration scholarship by studying the integration of domestic and EU
institutions in the agenda setting phases of the EU decision-making process.
This is a dense chapter, which is well cited and supported by the latest
literature in the field of administrative law. The analysis employed here is
strictly from a social science perspective.
Chapter 2 reflects the fact, which is well documented by the authors,
that administrators play a crucial role within the EU decision-making process
even though the actual number of staff working within the EC institutions is
comparatively low. The main conclusion drawn by the study presented in this
chapter shows that EC preparatory bodies do not just carry out certain
preparatory work; they also help broker compromises. This chapter is a study
of both roles and practices of preparatory bodies of the EC as well as the roles
of administrators. It is a well thought out, thorough study that helps explain
the complex intermingling of various administrative facets of the EU.
Throughout their analysis, the authors focus on improvements for current
regulatory mechanisms.
Chapter 3 focuses on the administrative policy implementation. The
current and future constitutional structures, under the EU/EC treaty and under
the treaty establishing a constitution for Europe, are no more than a
framework. This chapter explains both the legality of the delegation of
administrative powers and the constitutional principles of administrative law
in the form of substantial and procedural fundamental rights. The main
conclusion of the chapter is that broad constitutional structures do not change
the fact that the details of structures of EU administrative governance for
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implementation are developed by secondary legislation and institutional
practice in every policy area. With respect to the protection of individual
rights, this chapter does not analyze the types of legal acts that can be the
result of administrative action in the EU. Instead, it takes more of an inside
point of view by systemizing and giving an overview of forms of co-operation
between administrations from different levels.
Part II of the book entitled “Sectoral Areas” contains the next 8
chapters. This portion of the book analyzes various administrative law areas.
First, the authors examine the comitology in EU’s environmental policy and
European governance of food safety. Next, the authors analyze the
modernization of EC antitrust enforcement, the need for a single EU securities
regulator, and the relationship of administrative governance to state aid
policy. The last three chapters analyze asylum and immigration policy, EU
police and judicial co-operation, and the common foreign and security policy
as they individually relate to administrative governance. Each chapter makes
excellent use of supporting documentation and provides a useful, if not
familiar, critique of the procedural mechanism from its theoretical basis to its
implementation stages. This section of the book is strong because it makes
excellent use of data as well as available legislation to ensure that readers
arrive at the same conclusion as the author. Nevertheless, each chapter
suffers from the “individual essay” syndrome. Instead of blending together,
each chapter may be read as an individual essay with little or no connection to
the chapter following it.
Part III of the book entitled “Cross-section” analysis contains the final
4 chapters. The authors first review and analyze the EU committee
governance and they conclude that a considerable amount of time and energy
is spent on these assignments by representatives of the individual states. The
study successfully shows that smaller EU member states spend more time on
these committees than their larger counterparts. The next essay deals with the
thorny issue of comitology and European Courts. The author of this chapter
exquisitely demonstrates the fact that on occasion courts have been
inconsistent and unpredictable when applying existing general administrative
law principles. The author seems optimistic about the progress of comitology
in Europe although the early results have left the final results quite
unpredictable.
The last two chapters examine various models and scenarios faced by
the EU in its quest for a form of unified administrative governance. The
theoretical approach by the authors is well documented and thorough but it
lacks much practical appeal outside the realm of law practice. The reader is
not only made aware of the current problems of democratic legitimacy in a
supranational government but also of potential new problems that may arise.
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The chapter is well thought out and timely but largely a theoretical analysis in
light of the missing constitutional piece currently plaguing the EU.
Overall, this work is a critical analysis of the current body of EC
administrative governance up to February 2006. The book is well researched
and exquisitely cited so to provide its readers with a quick reference to the
most pertinent case law holdings and legislation in this growing area of law.
This work, however, is a compilation of individual essays rather than a
cohesive, free flowing text. The book contains numerous references and
notes, tables of various study results, as well as a table of legislation necessary
in any EU law text. The book is not conventionally organized, and it lacks the
easy follow through reading of a classic textbook. Nevertheless its exquisite
analysis of a difficult regulatory arena warrants a recommendation for law
schools that offer comparative law courses or courses in European Union law.
Dragomir Cosanici
Head of Information Services
Indiana University School of Law at Indianapolis
Indianapolis, IN USA
Fresh Water and International Economic Law. Edited by Edith Brown
Weiss, Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, and Nathalie BernasconiOsterwalder. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Pp. xxv,
480. ISBN 0-19-927467-3. £74.95; US$145.00
In one way or another, water plays a role in the provision of all basic
human needs and luxuries: ecology, health, agriculture, sanitation,
transportation, recreation, culture, energy, manufactured products, etc. No
other natural resource is more universally essential or more diverse in its
beneficial uses to humans than fresh water.
As an introductory text in 15 chapters, Fresh Water and International
Economic Law “focuses on the implications of the use of water as an
economic good, the implications of commoditization of fresh water, and the
bearing of international economic law on water issues.” The predominant
theme throughout the book is that society’s interest in promoting the equitable
and efficient use of this essential resource is reflected both in the symbolic
human rights view of fresh water and in its economic value.
This timely volume acknowledges all of the complex and conflictridden issues revolving around water uses in the context of currently existing
trade instruments, regulatory mechanisms, and contemporary legal thought.
Is there a human right to water? What does that right encompass? Can we
balance competing interests and encourage efficiency? How will scarce water

2007]

BOOK REVIEWS

169

resources be allocated? How will economic models look and operate? How
will conflicts be resolved?
The movement in water management, which is not new but on the
rise, from supply augmentation (dam projects and storage reservoirs) to
reallocation (water transfers) argues that markets rather than administrators
should determine the comparative value of alternative water uses. However,
international efforts to manage, protect, and distribute water must consider the
multiple uses of water and the complex interactions among users. While
international trade and privatization seem like useful mechanisms to equalize
access and increase efficiency, significant challenges are also present.
The authors of this book provide a practical analysis of international
trade agreements and other documents that are or may be applied to water
resources and the roles of international organizations in these issues. A
number of the chapters analyze historical and/or new legal theories relevant to
water that intersect with trade agreements and the mechanisms by which they
are implemented. Often, the authors lay out background on general economic
theories, legal theories of property rights, and statistics relating to water
resources. Throughout, the geography of specific examples is diverse.
The five broad topics of the book cover: (I) issues arising out of
transfers of fresh water; (II) water services and the right to water; (III)
groundwater use and agricultural subsidies; (IV) water and investment; and
(V) resolving conflicts over water. In Part I, the authors analyze how water
disputes arise, compare US constitutional law to international trade law, and
discuss how trade laws apply to the transportation of water and when water
becomes a “product” or “good” subject to trade laws.
The contributions in part II explain how the right to water is implicit
in legal human rights instruments, discuss the extent to which water-related
services (e.g., sanitation) may be covered by the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS), and explore how GATS rules may detrimentally impact a
government’s ability to regulate privatized water services.
Part III reveals the effects of agricultural subsidies, recognizes the
divergent meanings of “water use efficiency” and the diverse objectives
regarding water management, and explores the question: Does international
trade law offer a means to reduce or eliminate detrimental subsidies? In Part
IV, the authors discuss such topics as investment rules and foreign investment
protection, how these rules affect the ability of governments to manage and
protect water resources, specific cases decided under NAFTA, how
investment treaties can help settle water disputes, and participatory standards
for local communities. Finally, Part V examines inter-State mechanisms for
dispute resolution, procedures available to non-State actors, and the roles of
transparency, effective public participation and amicus curiae in resolving
water disputes.
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Fresh Water and International Economic Law is one of the latest of
11 titles published since 2001 in the Oxford University International
Economic Law series. This compilation was inspired in part by two
exploratory seminars in 2002 and 2003 organized by the Georgetown
University Law Center and likely was encouraged by the United Nations’
official recognition of the right to water in 2002.
Resources in the volume include a two-page list of acronyms and
abbreviations; 15 tables, figures and maps; and eight Appendixes. The
Appendixes include excerpts from relevant international documents, a
bibliography, and a three-page list of water-related web sites.
Although some chapters admit a utopian vision and a more truly global view
of resource use and human survival than currently seems possible, the text
generally offers balanced and thoughtful suggestions for resolution of the
issues presented. As a timely introduction to international trade law and to
current legal thought on fresh water issues specifically, Fresh Water and
International Economic Law is a complement to other legal materials on
international, economic, environmental, human rights, and natural resources
topics.
Debra Denslaw
Ruth Lilly Law Library
Indiana University School of Law – Indianapolis
Indianapolis, IN USA

International Law in Domestic Courts (ILDC)
Oxford University Press (2006-)
http://ildc.oxfordlawreports.com
http://www.oxfordonline.com/freetrials
£1300-1500/$2000-2490 for academic institutions
For more information, please contact Julie McGeough at OUP, (212) 7266419; julie.mcgeough@oup.com
This new online resource from Oxford University Press (OUP) is a
welcome addition to the realm of international legal research materials.
International Law in Domestic Courts (ILDC) is a database containing cases
from national courts that deal with international law topics from over 60
jurisdictions. The special features include English translations of cases and
scholarly commentary by experts highlighting the most important points of
international law. The cases are supposed to be the ones that are “setting
precedents, reaffirming standards, or are otherwise addressing some critical
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issue in international law.”392 More detailed information about how cases are
selected is available on the website.393
According to the website, “[t]he cases are selected by local reporters
in conjunction with the OUP editorial board and feature expert commentary,
full texts of judgments in their original language and translations of key
passages of non-English judgments into English.” The reporters come from a
variety of jurisdictions and many work in major law schools. Depending on
the country, there may be one or more than ten reporters. The reporters
provide the bulk of the content: they suggest cases for inclusion, draft the
reports, revise reports after the editors have reviewed them, and supply the
text of the judgments (often indicating which sections should be translated).
They also keep the content fresh by notifying OUP of changes or updates to
the cases.
The Editorial Board is comprised of people who were chosen based
on their expertise in the application of international law in domestic law.
They also represent various regions of the world: Europe, Africa, Latin
America, Israel and the Middle East, North America, and Asia. The editorial
board works under the direction of André Nollkaemper and Erika de Wet,
professors at the University of Amsterdam Center for International Law.394
This editorial board is unique because it was involved during the conceptual
stages of the project and they continue to provide their expertise by reviewing
and editing the case notes and commentaries.

392
393

47 Law Librarian Newsletter 1 (Winter 2006/2007).

http://ildc.oxfordlawreports.com/uid=105396/subscriber/about_ildc?topic=about_ildc
_main.
394
http://www.jur.uva.nl/aciluk/.
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Figure 1: ILDC Homepage
Basically, ILDC is a straight-forward database to use. You can search
or browse the database. Right now, browsing works well since there is not a
large number of cases. As you can see from Figure 2, there are 17 categories
and the total number of cases for each category is indicated by the number on
the right. Not surprisingly, there are more cases in the areas of human rights
and criminal law than in economic or environmental law. Browsing by
jurisdiction and alphabetically by case name is also available.

Figure 2: Key Category Browse Page
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Two search mechanisms are provided: a quick search and an
advanced search (see Figure 3). The “Help” pages provide good instructions
on how to use both search functions, along with tips on how to combine them.
The advanced search has several search options. The “key category” field
contains the same topical areas as the browse feature. There is an extensive
keyword search as well as fields for jurisdiction, parties, and search terms.
The free text search field and the quick search allow for stemming, use of
Boolean operators, and phrase searching. Searches can be limited by date and
to either the headnotes or judgments only.

Figure 3: Advanced Search Page
Each document (report) in the database has the following components,
including a good deal of value-added content:
• information about the case (jurisdiction, citations, date of decision,
court, judges, procedural stage, subsequent case development)
• key categories (searchable via the advanced search)
• keywords (searchable via the advanced search)
• core issues of the case
• facts
• holding
• commentary by the reporter (also called commentator, the name is
listed on the navigation side of the report)
• judgment, both in the original language and an English translation

174

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION

[Vol. 35.1

The navigation bar on the left side of the screen allows you to jump to
various sections of the document and provides several print options (Figure
4). A truly valuable feature is the ability to access the original judgment as
well as the translation (see Figure 5).

Figure 4: Sample from a Section of a Report

Figure 5: Original Judgment
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Other features include a list of newly added, updated, and upcoming
case reports, and a new case alerts email service (see Figure 6).

Figure 6: Sample of Case Alert Email
The database does have some limitations. On the content side, the
biggest limitation is the number of cases, approximately 200 cases at the time
of the writing of this review. It is important to note that the archive of cases is
not extensive and for several jurisdictions the collection only goes back to
2000. However, new content is constantly being added.
On the functionality side, there is no way to save searches or mark
what you find to create a cite list. It would be handy to be able to mark cases
and email them or create a list to email or print. An email feature that allows
you to have the data in text format with live links would also be useful.
Currently, the only output feature is print (in HTML), so you cannot
download or email easily. Also, you can only print the entire report or only
the headnotes. Other limitations include the inability to search by original
case citation (although you can search via the fee text field) and there is no
way to sort or limit an existing search.
ILDC is still a work in progress with many future developments
planned. OUP plans to add better ways to refine searches and sort results;
include the ability to browse by year; add additional print options (such as
printing documents as PDFs); and make a complete list of all of the cases
accepted for inclusion available on the site. In addition to new functionality,
there is a plan to add a collection of jurisprudence from international courts
and tribunals. The first of these, on international criminal law (edited by
William Schabas) will be ready in November, 2007. Another module will
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focus on human rights cases from the UN treaty bodies as well as the cases
from other human rights systems. While these collections will require a
separate subscription, users will be able to search across collections using one
interface.
The practice of States, which includes the decisions issued by
domestic courts, is important when dealing with the application and
interpretation of international law. In the past, locating this information was
challenging at best. Researchers had to comb through State yearbooks on
international law, International Law Reports,395 and other tools that lack some
of ILDC’s strengths, namely timeliness and being able to search
electronically. Therefore, I highly recommend this database for those who are
interested in the relationship between international and domestic law as well
as those interested in dispute settlement. As this database develops, it will
become an important tool for scholars, practitioners, judges, and students.
Marci Hoffman
Associate Director and International & Foreign Law Librarian
University of California, Berkeley School of Law Library
Berkeley, CA USA

Can Might Make Rights? Building the rule of law after military
interventions. By Jane Stromseth, David Wippman, and Rose Brooks.
Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp. x, 414. ISBN
978-0-521-67801-8. £17.99; US$29.99
According to the authors of Can Might Make Rights? Building the
rule of law after military interventions, “building the rule of law is a constant
balancing act.” There is no one path or process that will always work to
establish the rule of law in a post-intervention society. Interveners must be
aware of the possible pitfalls as they approach the establishment of the rule of
law. They must have a sense of the cultural framework of the country and be
mindful of this as they consider the legal institutions that should be
developed. Historically, there are numerous examples of failed attempts to
establish the rule of law because the interveners have not considered the
whole process and have focused on specific aspects, such as rebuilding the
police force, establishing the legislature, or writing a constitution. While
these are certainly important goals, creating the rule of law is much more
complex than those individual steps.
395

International Law Reports (1950-) and Annual Digest and Reports of Public
International Law Cases (1919-1949).
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With this in mind, Jane Stromseth, David Wippman, and Rosa Brooks
have written Can Might Make Rights: Building the Rule of Law After Military
Interventions. Their goal for the book is “to offer enough theoretical and
historical background to enable readers to contextualize and understand the
basic dilemmas inherent in interventions designed to build the rule of law
while offering concrete suggestions for getting it right in the future.” The
book was originally conceived with a focus on humanitarian interventions and
the development of the rule of law following that type of intervention.
However, in the wake of September 11th, it evolved to include interventions
motivated by national security concerns. The authors realized that although
the basis for intervention was different, the problems that arose in postconflict attempts to establish the rule of law were similar.
In the introductory chapter, the authors discuss the rule of law using
the metaphor of building a house. This is a helpful technique because it
clearly sets forth the vital steps of establishing the rule of law, yet it places
them in a context that may be more familiar. Important aspects include
understanding how previous houses have been built, getting the proper
blueprint, gathering the necessary resources, and showing the occupants that
the house is worth waiting for. Applying these concepts to the creation of the
rule of law, what is needed are “a basic theoritcial and historical background,
a blueprint, building blocks, money, appropriately skilled people, and a
cultural commitment to the underlying project.” The chapters of the book
follow this structure and discuss these steps in sequence. Examples from
recent post-intervention attempts to establish the rule of law in countries such
as Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Afghanistan,
and Iraq are included throughout the book. These are helpful because they
put the theoritcial concepts into a more understandable context.
Chapters two and three examine the historical and theoretical
framework. Understanding this background and learning from it are key
elements for current attempts to build the rule of law. Chapter 2 begins with a
discussion of the general international legal bases for intervention. It gives
examples of interventions that were considered legitimate, such as
Afghanistan and Somalia, and those that were more controversial, such as
Kosovo and Iraq. This discussion is relevant because the perceived
legitimacy and/or legality of the intervention can have a strong impact on the
effort to build the rule of law. Chapter 3 presents a detailed discussion of
what exactly the rule of law is. As the authors point out there is no single
agree-upon definition for the rule of law. An Analysis of the different
theories relating to how to conceptualize the rule of law is presented, as is a
historical look at rule of law programs and how they have been arranged.
Following this background discussion, the authors present their definition of
the rule of law, which they describe as “descriptive and pragmatic” and which
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serves as an introduction to their approach to creating the rule of law that they
call a “synergistic approach.” The synergistic approach has three key
elements; it is end-based, adaptive, and systemic. Each of these elements is
explained within the context of building the rule of law.
In Chapter 4, the authors discuss the importance of “the blueprint for
the political reconstruction of the affected country.” Blueprints are intended
to set out the steps by which the rule of law can be established. Out of
necessity, they will be developed on a case-by-case basis because each
country has a different cultural background and each intervention has a
specific underlying cause. The chapter uses a number of different countries as
examples to illustrate the blueprint design process and to highlight some of
the successes and failures that can occur.
The major building blocks for the creation of the rule of law are
outlined in chapters five, six, and seven. These chapters address the issues
with the application of the “synergistic approach” developed in Chapter 3,
which shows the ways that this approach can improve the progress toward the
rule of law. The focus of chapter 5 is on reestablishing security, which in the
authors’ opinion is the most important step toward building the rule of law.
Chapter 6 provides a look at how to build or rebuild the justice system, which
includes not only the courts, but also the police force and prisons. Respect for
human rights and determining how to hold people accountable for past
atrocities is the topic in Chapter 7. These chapters are full of clear, well
thought out discussions and provide examples of how they have been handled
in recent post-conflict situations.
The last major factor to be considered is the cultural commitment to
the rule of law. Attempts to establish the rule of law will have a hard time
succeeding in the absence of the acceptance by the people who are going to
subject to it. In Chapter 8, the authors discuss the necessity of creating a rule
of law culture, where the vast majority of the people understand the value of
the legal institutions and support them. They describe both the important
issues and possible pitfalls present during the development of a rule of law
culture. Finally, Chapter 9 applies the concepts of the synergistic approach to
the area of rule of law assistance and explores how effective planning and
coordinated efforts among the different international actors can produce a
more successful rule of law structure.
Ms. Stromseth, Mr. Wippman, and Ms. Brooks specifically state that
Can Might Make Rights is not a how-to manual. Their purpose is to set forth
a practical and pragmatic framework that can be referenced as interveners and
others begin the process of developing the rule of law in post-conflict
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situations. In this regard, the book succeeds, as it sets out their ‘synergistic
approach’ for implementing the rule of law in a manner that is understandable
and useful.
Karin Johnsrud
Reference Librarian
Arthur W. Diamond Law Library
Columbia University School of Law
New York, NY USA
The Judge in a Democracy. By Aharon Barak. Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 2006. Pp. 360. ISBN 978-0-691-12017-1.
US$29.95.
Princeton University Press has just published another book written by
the prolific President of the Israeli Supreme Court, Aharon Barak.396 With the
exception of three chapters singled out in this review, this work of the
internationally famous jurist has little that will be novel to anyone who has
given considerable thought to the job of judging. However, for those who
may be interested in the underpinnings of the philosophy of an activist,
audacious judge (the “John Marshall of Israel”), or those who may be
interested in getting a sense of the work of an impressive judicial system, this
book is well worth reading.397
To better comprehend the significance of Barak’s book and to
understand what has shaped his judicial philosophy, brief sections on Israel’s
history, governance, and the work of its Supreme Court precede its
consideration.
A Capsule Background on the History of Israel, Its Governance, and the Work
of the Israeli Supreme Court

396

THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY is a substantially expanded version of an
article that originally appeared in the Harvard Law Review. See Aharon Barak,
Foreword: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV.L.REV. 16
(2002). See also Aharon Barak, The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, and
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Surely, the judiciary of a small nation, besieged for its more than fifty
year history, lacking a constitution,398 and yet remaining throughout a republic
with an independent judiciary almost as protective of human rights as any in
the world is worth attention. Moreover, there are those who believe that the
judicialization of politics has “probably proceeded further in Israel than in any
other democratic country.”399
Israel, gained its independence in 1948. Intended as one of two states
to be created from the mandated Palestine territory, Israel was attacked by its
neighbors almost immediately after it declared its independence and has been
in a state of emergency ever since. From the birth of the state until 1977, the
Labor Party (Mapai) has dominated Israeli governance. Since that time Israel
has been governed by short-term Parliamentary coalitions unable to give
strong leadership in dealing with major problems. From its birth, Israel has
had to come to grips with major problems that would trouble any nation.
Additionally, Israel is faced with issues associated with being a Jewish state,
including assimilation of Jewish immigrants, relations between synagogue
and state, and terrorism.400 The political culture of the Jewish state has been
greatly affected by four major wars; waves of immigration from Europe,
Muslim states, and the former Soviet Union; and the debate over the future of
the territories seized in the Six Day War of 1967, a debate which grew in
intensity after the 1973 Yom Kippur War. If in the early years of the State
there were deep divisions between the very religious and the secular
Ashkenazim from Northern Europe, almost sixty years later the polity is not
only divided between those two groups, but also the Sephardim, the Russian
immigrants, and the Arabs.401
Public cynicism born of rampant partisanship, self-interested politics,
and ineffectual governance eased the way for the expansion of judicial power.
Israel’s judges, particularly its Supreme Court, proved ready to decide
398
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difficult policy questions regardless of political fallout. As a result, many
questions of policy were transformed into legal questions by attorneys and
resolved by the courts. The political branches often felt relieved, and Israel’s
courts became more controversial.402
The writing of a constitution for Israel was delayed by the war that
immediately followed the creation of the State. This result did not displease
Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, who saw advantages for the
governing Mapai Party from a Knesset unconfined by a constitution and who
also realized that his coalition government would be jeopardized by a battle
between Orthodox and secular forces over the role of Jewish law in the new
state. Instead of writing a constitution, a process was agreed upon where the
Knesset could enact “Basic Laws,” building a constitution, chapter by chapter,
that ultimately could be unified. Most of the Basic Laws would contain
provisions to insure that they would not be altered or superseded by
emergency resolutions, but otherwise they were not formally entrenched.403
From 1958 to 2001 fourteen Basic Laws were adopted by the Knesset dealing
with such matters as the Knesset, the President, the Armed Forces, and Rights
of Human Dignity and Liberty.
The Supreme Court of Israel is not only Israel’s highest appellate
court, but as a court of first instance (the High Court of Justice) it may hear
anyone with a grievance against the government. The High Court of Justice
has the power to issue writs of habeas corpus as well as other prerogative
writs. In this way, actions challenging government policy may be brought
directly to the Court.404
The fourteen Justices of the Supreme Court405 and the judges of lower
courts are chosen by a nine-person committee chaired by the Minister of
Justice. One other member of the Cabinet, three members of the Supreme
Court (including its President), two members of the Knesset and two members
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of the Israeli bar also sit on the committee.406 It has been suggested that
during his presidency, Aharon Barak has dominated the process of selection.
However, appointments have largely been based on merit. Judges, attorneys
or academics can be members of the Israeli Supreme Court. The Justices
have life tenure but also a fixed retirement age of seventy.407
The status and jurisdiction of the judicial branch are not entrenched,
although the Court is unaffected by orders made under emergency
regulations.408 The Minister of Justice is responsible for managing the
administration of the courts, and with the consent of the president of the Court
chooses the director of the courts, who is accountable to the Minister.409 A
permanent parliamentary committee determines judicial salaries and
pensions.410
Thus, to protect the rule of law, the Israeli political elite insulated the
judiciary from the political environment. The courts have throughout the
history of Israel retained great public support and legitimacy as independent,
objective, and impartial. They have been seen as a fundamental barrier
against partisan decisions and as the guardians of fundamental values
embedded in the rule of law. Nevertheless, public criticism of the courts has
increased since the early 1990s.411
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The Israel Supreme Court, 1948-1978
At the time of independence, Israel inherited the British legal system
for the Palestine mandate; a system devoid of express legal guarantees of
political and civil liberties and rife with emergency regulations permitting the
suspension of rights.412 Yet, Israel also inherited from Great Britain the
principle of government under law. In its early years, the Israeli Supreme
Court was concerned with establishing its authority. Thus, the Court tended
to avoid direct confrontations with the political branches by deferring to the
Knesset, government, and Israeli defense forces. Even then the government
blatantly defied court orders and the Knesset often overruled the Court.
Nevertheless, the Court gradually established standards for the rule of law.
The Israeli Supreme Court was able to intervene in sensitive political
matters by employing the powers of statutory interpretation and
administrative review. Laws and administrative practices were interpreted
through a prism of human rights. The Court started with the premise that,
when legislating in any given area, the legislature had not harbored any
intention to deviate from basic individual rights, unless it had done so
explicitly and specifically. Legislation was also read in light of superstatutory principles, i.e., the Proclamation of Independence, principles of
democratic government and the rules of natural justice. Violations were
permissible only if explicitly authorized by law.
Where executive actions were concerned, the Court presumed that no
government official would act against an individual unless the official had
been clearly empowered to do so. Legislation delegating power to ministries
was not interpreted as delegating the power to enact restrictions on individual
liberty. Despite the absence of explicit statutory authorization, the Court was
willing and able to discern, infer or interpret protection of individual rights
within the law, and able to develop a conception of law based on a theory of
rights.413
It would take roughly a generation for the Israeli Supreme Court to
conclude that universally recognized basic human rights were part and parcel
of the Israeli legal system. The Court expanded its conception of the rule of
law, and asserted the right to interpret legislation in the light of principles of
412
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natural justice. By applying the doctrine of reasonableness, the Court evolved
from an organ whose function was to ensure that administrative bodies act
within their own jurisdiction into a court that applied substantive review of
the contents of administrative actions and policies.414 By 1974, it was clear
that the Court’s concern for the rule of law was being extended to protect
human rights. In this way, the Israeli Supreme Court came to play an
important role in establishing Israel’s commitment to a liberal political culture
of universal, equal civil rights and liberties.415
Aharon Barak
Aharon Barak was born in Kouno, Lithuania in 1936. Most of his
family was murdered in the Holocaust, but Barak and his parents survived the
Nazi occupation. After his father was released from Soviet prison,416 the
family fled on coal trains and arrived in Israel in 1947. Barak earned his first
degree in law from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem at the age of twentytwo and his doctorate at twenty-seven. A tenured professor at thirty-two,
Barak was appointed Dean of the law faculty of the Hebrew University in
1975. An important scholar, Barak is the author of ten books including five
volumes covering the interpretation of legal documents from constitutions and
statutes to contracts and wills.417
In 1975, Barak was also appointed Israel’s Attorney General. In that
office he prosecuted senior political figures including Leah Rabin, the wife of
Yitzhak Rabin, and served as a member of the Israeli negotiating team at
Camp David in 1978, where he acted as legal advisor, drafter and go-between.
The same year he was named to the Supreme Court. He became its Deputy
President in 1993 and President in 1995.418
As President of the Supreme Court, Barak has been a dominant force.
He is not only the intellectual leader of the court, he also exercises leadership
through the appointment and assignment process.419 For Barak, the role of the
judge is to protect freely the rule of law in a democratic society by ensuring
414
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the accessibility of courts, demanding that legislation be clear and by keeping
the actions of the government under judicial scrutiny.420 As a judge, Barak
has consistently and successfully challenged traditional doctrines limiting the
court’s power. He has developed a judicial philosophy which assumes that
anyone seeking a judicial decision on an issue that involves a substantive
violation of the law or a decision in a matter which the Court considers to be
in the “public interest,” deserves standing and, ordinarily, a decision on the
merits. Thus, he has successfully encouraged the court’s intervention in an
ever-growing range of cases.421
THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY
The Judge in a Democracy is a book by a judge about judging, and
more particularly about judging in a democracy during an era in which human
rights are “the core of substantive democracy.” Democracies are facing the
emerging threat of terrorism and the importance of the judiciary relative to the
other branches has increased.422
Barak rejects the convention that the judge merely states the law and
does not create it as a “fiction, even a childish approach.” In the “hard cases,”
judges exercise judicial discretion among a number of legitimate options.423
Barak is concerned with formulating a systematic and principled approach to
the exercise of discretion by judges. He devotes the first part of his book to
discussing the two central elements of the judicial role that go beyond actually
deciding a dispute. The first element is bridging the gap between law and
society as a partner in creating the law with the legislature. Barak sees the
responsibility of the law to be responsive to change in society. The other
element is protecting the constitution and substantive democracy as expressed
in the concept of separation of powers, the rule of law, fundamental
principles, the independence of the judiciary, and human rights.424
The second part of Barak’s book contains two of the chapters that
Americans may find the most thought provoking, i.e., those on nonjusticiability and standing. In this section Barak also explores the means by
which a court can fulfill its role. He touches upon public confidence,
common law decision-making, and constitutional and statutory interpretation.
Barak also introduces his philosophy of “purposive interpretation,” a method
to realize the purpose the legal text serves. Purposive interpretation is the
420
421
422
423
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relationship between the objective purpose (hypothetical intent that a
reasonable author would want to realize) and the subjective purpose (real
intent of the author).425 Barak next looks to balancing and weighing as a
judicial tool and finally at the significance of comparative law.426 He holds
comparative law to be of great assistance in judging and expanding a judge’s
horizons and interpretive fields of vision. Comparative law helps
understanding of judicial interpretation’s place and the role of the judge as an
interpreter by illuminating those instances where democracy infringes on
fundamental values, and it also presents alternatives in considering
solutions.427
In the third section of the book, Barak discusses the relationship in a
democracy between the court and the political branches. Tension between the
courts and the political branches is natural and desirable according to Barak.
If the court’s rulings were always satisfactory to the other branches, it would
raise the suspicion that the court was not properly filling its role in a
democracy.428 Barak distinguishes between: (1) societies that regard the state
with great suspicion, such as the United States, (2) societies where the state
represented by the legislature and the executive is a realization of national
aspiration, and (3) societies where the state is viewed as both a source of good
and evil, within which the law is made up of positive and negative rights of
government. This last group includes Canada and Israel.
In this section Barak also includes discussions of judicial review of
legislation and of non-legislative decisions of the legislature, as well as
reasonableness and proportionality as judicial tools. Barak discusses the need
for constant dialogue between the judiciary and the legislature, which occurs
when each branch carries out its institutional role. He supports the Canadian
and Israeli legal systems, which permit the legislature to overrule a Supreme
Court decision voiding a statute and allow the legislature to pass a new statute
when the courts interpret a statute in a manner that is unacceptable to the
legislature.429
In the fourth part of the book, Barak evaluates the role of the judge in
a democracy, evaluates judicial activism and judicial self-restraint, and looks
specifically at judging in an age of terrorism. For Barak, the role of the
activist and the self-restrained judge relates to how well the judge realizes
his/her role of bridging the gap between law and society’s changing reality of
425
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protecting the constitution and its values. Barak refuses to classify himself as
judicially restrained or judicially active, stating that he favors graduated
change in law, i.e., change in accordance with the “general framework of the
system, normative coherence, organic growth, natural development,
continuity and consistency.”430 A judge, he concludes, “can best bridge the
gap between law and society by exercising partial activism and partial
restraint.”431
The last part of the last section of the book concludes with a chapter
on the role of the judge in theory, in reality as well as in the future. Barak
states that in creating new law, the judge should first bridge the gap between
social reality and the law,432 and second, protect the constitution and its
values. Barak believes that a judge should try to develop a judicial philosophy
rather than act intuitively.433 For Barak, that philosophy is purposive
interpretation. In the future, change, both technological and social, will occur
even more rapidly than before and legislatures will not always be able to keep
pace with these changes. Thus, society will need more than ever its courts to
bridge the gaps between law and life.434 Democracy, Barak says, needs strong
courts especially when it has a strong legislature and executive.435 Barak
concludes by denying that he has a political platform. He emphasizes the
“chains” that bind him as a judge and as the President of the Supreme Court,
and writes of judging as a mission. It is not a job; It is a way of life.
Barak on Justiciability, Standing and the Judicial Role and Terrorism
While The Judge in a Democracy predominantly outlines the role of a
judge within a structure familiar to most Americans, three chapters, i.e., those
on justiciability, standing and the judicial role, and the problem of terrorism
will be found particularly provocative, for their approach is quite different
from the practice in the United States.
For Barak, the separation of powers is the backbone of the
constitution.436 The three branches of government are of equal status, each
having its own unique character. However, Barak has little patience for the
“political question” doctrine. He begins with the view that the “law is
everywhere.”437 Whereas Barak may examine a decision on its merits or may
430
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ultimately abstain from making a decision for lack of a cause of action,438 he
does not believe that a court should abdicate its role in a democracy merely
because it is uncomfortable or fears tension with other branches of the state.
For Barak, refusal of the Court to judge an issue is “political thinking which is
inappropriate for a court.”439Each branch is authorized and obligated to
interpret the scope of its own authority. However, when a dispute arises as to
the legality of that interpretation, the formal decision is in the hands of the
judiciary.440 Barak does not, however, add much to the traditional arguments
that political non-accountability, professional training, and independence
make the judiciary the most qualified to decide such disputes. “More than
any branch, judges can be trusted to adjudicate objectively and
appropriately.”441
Where the separation of powers is concerned, the role of the judge in
a legal system whose values are democratic is “to preserve and protect the
separation of powers.”442 In contrast to the federal courts in the United States,
Barak believes the judiciary should act when coordinate branches acts
unlawfully. In the United States, the federal courts will not void a pardon
given for improper motives, overturn defects in Senate impeachment
procedures, or reverse the President’s action where he would not dismiss a
Secretary of State facing criminal proceedings. In contrast, for Barak, the
situations in which the courts refrain from exercising their jurisdiction would
be rare and exceptional. 443
Barak discusses both normative justiciability, i.e., whether there are
legal criteria to resolve a dispute, and institutional justiciability, which
focuses on whether it is desirable to decide a dispute that is normatively
justiciable.444 Institutional justiciability for Barak seems to have no
independent existence.445 Barak rejects the view that some cases contain a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for their
resolution.446 Every legal problem, he says, “is encompassed in the world of
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law.”447 Barak has even argued in dicta that issues regarding war and peace
may be justiciable.448
For Barak that does not mean that legal solutions are always the best
solutions. The mere fact that an issue is political, i.e., it has political
ramifications and predominantly political elements, “does not mean that it
cannot be resolved by a court.”449 That a certain matter is entrusted
exclusively to one branch is not a permit for that branch to act unlawfully
within the framework of that authority, nor does it mean that the question of
the legality of that act is also entrusted to that branch of state. Political
authorities are free to act within but not without the law.450 The solution for
Barak, therefore, may often be that the Court decides the case on the merits,
but holds that the government has acted within a zone of reasonableness. He
has, for example, taken the position that the issue of whether the government
could release a terrorist within the framework of a political “package deal”
was justiciable, but that the legal criteria to resolve the matter fell within the
discretion of the executive.451
Barak disagrees with the view that there are disputes that are
impossible to resolve judicially without expressing respect for
coordinate branches of the state. He says that “[I]t is
inconceivable that preferring the judicial interpretation to the
interpretation of the other branch expresses disrespect for that
branch. There is no disrespect to the other branches when each
branch fulfills its constitutional role and does what the law has
ordered it to do.”452 Barak also disputes the view that recognition
of institutional non-justiciability is implicit in the concept of
democracy itself.453
Finally, Barak is unwilling to be swayed by the fact that institutional
non-justiciability is justified, because it protects the court itself from a
“politicization of the judiciary” that could undermine the confidence of the
public in the courts. The role of the court”, he says, “is to adjudicate disputes
even if the public or some portion of it does not like the outcome.”454 No one
447
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can fault the Israeli Supreme Court of the last twenty-five years for timidity.
The Court has been repeatedly willing to examine the internal decisions of the
Knesset.455 It went to the merits and ruled that expropriating land in an area
under Israeli military occupation for the purpose of establishing a settlement
was unlawful.456 It has ruled on the validity of a pardon granted by the
President of the State to the Israeli General Security Service and to a number
of its agents for illegal acts they had committed.457 It has held that methods of
interrogation employed against terrorists, such as sleep deprivation, head
covering, and painful sitting positions, were illegal even if used to prevent the
“explosion of a ticking bomb.”458 Thus, it may not be surprising that Barak
praises the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to go to the merits in Bush v.
Gore.459
The political question doctrine in American law is “confusing and
unsatisfactory,” and an area which has not profited by judicial consistency.460
It is now limited to the Republican Form of Government Clause of Article
Four, with cases involving activities of political parties, foreign affairs issues,
Congress’s ability to regulate its internal processes, the process for ratifying
constitutional amendments, the impeachment process, and instances where a
federal court cannot shape equitable relief and American judges with cases in
some of these areas might profit by consideration of Barak’s approach, even
though Israeli judges are advantaged by the fact that they need not be
constrained about exercising undemocratic authority, because in the absence
of a comprehensive, written constitution, their decisions can in some areas be
overridden by a legislative majority.461
STANDING
On and off the bench, Barak has been a strong advocate of very
liberal approaches to standing. Barak’s audaciousness takes him far beyond
American judges, who are somewhat limited by Article III of the U.S.
Constitution. Barak regards his role as a judge not merely as a dispute-settler,
but also as one responsible for “bridging the gap between law and society and
455
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protecting …democracy.” Such a judge will tend to expand the rules of
standing and release judges from the requirement of an injury in fact. For
Barak and his Court, virtually everyone has standing to challenge the legality
of a civil servant’s behavior. Barak’s court has adopted the view that when a
claim alleges a major violation of the rule of law in its broad sense, every
person in Israel has legal standing to sue.462
Barak sees the connection between the rules of standing and the
principle of the rule of law. Closing the doors of the court to a petitioner with
no injury in fact, who is complaining about an unlawful action of a public
body, means giving that public body a free hand to act without fear of judicial
review.463 Barak seconds the observations of Lord Diplock that, “it would in
my view, be a grave lacuna in our system of public law if a pressure
group…or even a single public-spirited taxpayer, were prevented by outdated
rules of locus standi from bringing the matter to the attention of the court to
vindicate the rule of law and get the unlawful conduct stopped.”464 In the end,
Barak takes “issue with a standing doctrine under which someone who claims
that a public body unlawfully took his private money can resort to the courts,
but someone who claims that a public body unlawfully took public money
cannot.”465
In its role as the High Court of Justice, the Israel Supreme Court
reviewed public petitions raising such issues as: (1) whether the Attorney
General exercised his discretion properly in deciding not to indict someone,466
(2) whether the government held political negotiations over a peace
agreement at a time when it did not have the confidence of Parliament,467 and
(3) whether a parole board acted lawfully when it reduced a sentence imposed
by a civil court.468
If Article III of the American Constitution makes such an approach to
standing at times difficult and sometimes impossible, one still may regret
some of the lost opportunities to bring public authorities to account.
However, where the concern is not Article III but rather concern about
flooded dockets, it should be noted that the Israel Supreme Court has been
successful in balancing the importance of recognizing public petitions as
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safeguards for the rule of law and the fear of overburdening the court with
petitions.469
The Israeli Judiciary and Terrorism
American civil libertarians should envy the performance of the Israeli
Supreme Court as a protector of human rights in the occupied territories.
Terrorism creates tensions affecting the balance between majority rule and the
protection of individual rights. Barak’s position is that it is the judge’s role to
protect democracy from terrorism as well as from the means the state wants to
use to fight terrorism.470
In stark contract to the performance of most of the American judges,
trial and appellate, who have handled terrorism cases, Barak takes the position
that the protection of every individual’s human rights is much more important
during times of terrorism than in times of peace. Barak simply does not
accept the view, quaintly expressed in translation, that “when the cannons
speak, the Muses are silent.”471 He insists that it is unacceptable for the law to
be silent during battle. The struggle against terrorism should not be
conducted outside the law, but, rather, within the law. Barak does not agree
with Chief Justice William Rehnquist that such questions should be deferred
until the fight against terror is over. If so, he says, the protection of human
rights would be bankrupt.472 Barak states, “I must take human rights seriously
during times of peace and conflict. I must not make do with the mistaken
belief that, at the end of the conflict, I can turn back the clock.”473 It is in times
of terrorism when public opinion is most likely to favor actions that seem to
promote security that judicial independence is most necessary.474 Barak
reminds us “the test of the rule of law arises not merely in the few cases
brought before the court, but also in the many potential cases that are not
brought before it.”475
Palestinians who live in the occupied areas have access to the Israel’s
High Court. If earlier in his judicial career Barak signed his share of orders
approving exiles, demolition of houses, detention, torture, and land seizures,
in later years he has led the trend towards increased judicial review of the
State’s advancement of security considerations.476 In 1988, in the Schnitzler
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case, Barak wrote for the three-justice panel that overturned a decision by the
military censor banning publication in a Tel Aviv newspaper of selections
from an article about the Mossad.477 In 1998 Barak convened a special ninejustice panel to hear six new petitions involving allegations of torture.
Thereby, he signaled discomfort with the government’s reliance on the
defense of necessity. In September 1999, he wrote for a unanimous court that
held the methods of interrogation Shin Bet (one of Israel’s secret services)
employed against Palestinians detained without charges violated the right to
human dignity and freedom. The Court announced that it would no longer
defer to the government when individual rights were concerned, even if that
meant putting Israelis at risk, unless the Knesset could legalize torture as
comported with the Basic Law.478 The Court has also ordered the government
to change the route of the barrier separating Israel from Palestinian territory
and has prohibited the army’s practice of using Palestinians as “human
shields.”479
Barak promotes a single system of balancing, rather than one for
regular times and another when there is the threat of terrorism.480 To carefully
balance national security and human rights, he prescribes that: (1) the courts
should be open to anyone with a complaint about a public authority; ( 2) the
courts should be available in “real time,” i.e., when the situation is presented;
and 3) the courts should not reflexively rely on national security rationales.
Security considerations, he says, “are not magic words, nor can they be
‘pretextual’.”481 Instead, there should be specific consideration with the
specific solution least damaging to human rights. Thus, in Israel judicial
adjudication may come while the events being reviewed are taking place,
even at the beginning of an interrogation. Further, the High Court will hear
cases even if terrorist activities occur outside Israel or the terrorists are being
detained outside Israel.482
Barak argues that any balance that is struck between security and
freedom will impose certain limitations on both. Such a balance will not be
achieved when human rights are fully protected, nor when national security is
afforded full protection.483 Barak concludes, “[j]udicial review of the legality
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of the battle on terrorism may make the battle harder in the short term, but it
also fortifies and strengthens the people in the long term.”484
The Constitutionalization of Israeli Law by the Barak Court
It may be helpful to set Barak’s book against the jurisprudence of the
Israeli Supreme Court during Barak’s tenure as President of the Court.
During this time, with much criticism, Barak has declared a “constitutional
revolution.”485 This constitutional revolution fit smoothly with Barak’s
judicial philosophy. According to Barak, “if up until now judges were given
“conventional weapons” to deal with legislation by way of interpretation and
the creation of Israeli common law, not judges have been given “nonconventional” weapons.”486
The development of a constitution began with Chief Justice Moshe
Landau’s decision in Bergman v. Minister of Finance almost a decade before
Barak’s appointment.487 In that case, the Supreme Court for the first time
declared an act of the Knesset void for violating a Basic Law. The Court held
that a campaign financing law had not been adopted by the special majority of
the Knesset as required in the Basic Law: The Knesset. Furthermore, the law
unfairly discriminated against new political parties, thus violating the equality
of all before the law. Thus, the Court acted on the unarticulated premise that
Section 4 of the Basic Law: The Knesset provided the catalyst for Israel
accepting the principle that it ought to be governed within the parameters set
out by a written constitution authoritatively interpreted by its highest court.488
In December 1975, the government introduced the Basic Law:
Legislation and announced that all Basic Laws in existence and those later
enacted were to be treated as superior to other Knesset legislation. However,
the proposal was not adopted because of controversies over enactment of a
Bill of Rights as well as disagreements over entrenchment and the supremacy
of the Knesset.489
In 1979, a year after Barak was appointed to the Court, the tribunal
began in the Elon Moreh case to apply more substantive criteria in reviewing
administrative decisions. The case involved an order dismantling a West
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Bank settlement within thirty days and restoring land to its lawful owners,
who were Arabs. The Court held that security considerations were subject to
substantive review even when the authorities were operating within their
power. The Court looked behind the national security argument and found it
wanting.490
During the 1980s and early 1990s, when the political branches were
in a stalemate, the Court took on an increasingly activist role. Among its
decisions was one that ended censorship of the theater. Another
acknowledged the right of newspaper reporters to refrain from disclosure of
their sources. The Court also ordered the military to distribute gas masks to
Palestinian residents in the occupied territory during the Gulf War and forced
a judge of the High Rabbinical Court who had become the spiritual leader of a
political party to retire from his judicial post.491
During this period, the Court did not hesitate to intrude into the
operation of the other branches of government. It decided cases involving
internal matters of the Knesset, such as the Speaker’s interpretation of a
Knesset bylaw.492 The Court decided a case determining the power of the
minister of justice to refuse to surrender a criminal fugitive declared
extraditable by the courts.493 The Court ruled that Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rabin had to fire Interior Minister Aryeh Deri, who had been indicted for a
crime, even though the Knesset had prescribed in a statute that a minister
must resign when convicted of a crime.494 It also held unreasonable the
nomination of Yossef Ginossar, who had admitted to illegal actions and
received a pardon before any charges were brought, to be Director General of
the Housing Ministry.495 By 1992, there were few areas of public life beyond
the reach of court review.496
The Barak Court from 1992 to Date
As of 1992, observers had no trouble agreeing that Israel did not have
a constitution, and that the sovereignty of the Knesset was almost unlimited.
The Supreme Court would only invalidate legislation when it conflicted with
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a specifically entrenched clause of a Basic Law or when the majority had not
enacted a law specified by a clause in a Basic Law.497
In March 1992, with few members voting, the Knesset adopted two
Basic Laws, one on Freedom of Occupation and the other on Human Dignity
and Liberty.498 Section 5 of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation stated
that it might not be changed “except by a basic law enacted by the majority of
the Knesset,” thus entrenching that whole Basic Law. That Basic Law also
provided a standard for the Knesset to live up to when limiting the rights
stated in the Basic Law, a standard implying judicial review. The Basic Law
Freedom of Occupation provided in Section 5 that the Knesset could pass
legislation that violated rights set out in the Basic Law, so long as such laws
suited Israel’s values, pursued a proper purpose, and violated the right to an
extent no greater than required.
While the Knesset did not clearly establish the superiority of the
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty over ordinary legislation nor
specifically give the courts authority to determine the constitutionality of
legislation that possibly conflicted with it, it provided in Section 8 that the
Basic Law shall not be infringed except by a statute that befits the values of
the State of Israel as a “Jewish and democratic state” and is directed towards a
worthy purpose, and then only to an extent that it does not exceed what is
necessary. Such a standard implied judicial review.499
Barak greeted the new order gleefully: “Every branch of the law and
every legal norm will have to adapt itself to the Constitutional rule,” he
said.500 In 1994, the Court found that the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation
had been infringed by the practice of prohibiting wholesale importation of
non-Kosher meat and struck down the law. The Knesset then overturned the
decision by an override and an explicit law.501
The following year, the Court held in the Bank Mizrachi case that the
Knesset had the authority to frame the Constitution and had done so in the
1992 Basic Laws. In the 139 page opinion, the Court with nine justices sitting
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held that it had the power to declare unconstitutional laws that do not comply
with the standards of the Basic Law.502 The Knesset acknowledged that
power by amending the Basic Law to allow for modifications by ordinary
laws if an absolute majority of the Knesset supported their passage. Thus, the
power of the Israeli Supreme Court had been expanded dramatically to
include the ability to strike down legislation, which in its opinion violated
normative rights.503
While the Supreme Court has only wielded its power to strike down
statutes twice since the Bank Mizrachi case, the existence of such an activist
court serves as a check on the range of options considered by the Knesset.504
More important may be the long series of basic rights that the Court has since
recognized as having constitutional dimension, including rights such as
freedom of expression, journalism, and demonstrations; the right to equality
and non-discrimination; freedom to pursue one’s own life plan; freedom from
state intrusion into one’s physical and mental privacy, and the right to an
education. The Court has even recognized social and economic rights.505
Criticisms of the Barak Court
The Court has given some of the Basic Laws constitutional status and
assumed the supreme authority to interpret them. With its great expansion of
its role as a policy-maker, the Court has somewhat injured its legitimacy. Its
security decisions have been unpopular, and as a result of other decisions, it
has become identified with the secular-liberal segment of Israeli society.506
Critics of the Court point out that “The decision to confer supremacy on the
court was never made by any popular organ [but] [i]t has been made by
judges, conferring power on the judges and placing that power beyond the
reach of both legislation and constitutional amendment itself.”507 In May
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2003, Knesset Speaker Reuven Rivlin charged that Israel had been the victim
of a constitutional putsch.508
In many ways, Israeli criticism of the Barak Court has been
reminiscent of the criticism of the Warren Court in the United States. The
Court has been criticized for acting as “the supreme moral arbiter of
society.”509 It has been accused of “usurping the legislature’s role…making
democratic politics…largely irrelevant.”510 It has been further argued that
“[r]ather than allowing the political process to handle problems through
consensus building and compromises, the current system encourages the
reduction of value-laden to technical questions, to be resolved by
adjudication.”511
The Court has also been criticized for taking sides, for drawing upon
“the majestic generalities” of the new Basic Laws, and for reflecting the
values of an “enlightened community” just like them, which is comfortable
with individual autonomy and human rights.512 Ruth Gavison states that it is
wrong for the court to make use of its power to “decide in favor of
Westernism and against traditionalism; or in favor of modernity and
individualism and against communitarianism.”513 A more extreme critic has
paired Barak with Ariel Sharon as having a hidden agenda “to emasculate
Jews and erase Israel’s Jewish character.”514
The Court has lost support among Jewish nationalists, the Orthodoxy,
and security maximalists.515 The backlash against the Court has led to large
demonstrations. It has also led to proposals to increase the number of justices
as well as to an attempt to deprive the Supreme Court of much of its
jurisdiction by creating a new “constitutional court.” Barak responded by
calling the proposed constitutional court “a cockroach.”516
Conclusions
Within months, Aharon Barak will retire from the Israel Supreme
Court after a twenty-eight year tenure, thirteen as its President. At a time it is
under attack, the Court will sustain the loss of a commanding presence and
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towering intellect who has polished political skills. In addition, Barak’s seat
is only one of several that will need filling. The Minister of Justice has
postponed convening the committee that appoints Justices, because she
believes it is stacked against the appointment of Ruth Gavison, a towering
intellect who objects to Barak’s views on judicial review, justiciability, and
much else.517
Heretofore, the Court has been protected from serious damage.
Successive governments of Israel have accepted the constraints placed on
them by the Court, apparently because of the net benefit they receive from
decisions conferring legitimacy upon them.518 The Court has used its wiles
and rendered judgments that have avoided confrontation by postponing
operative orders.519 And, in spite of the growth of criticism, public opinion
remains behind the Court, based upon a belief that security from arbitrary
governmental coercion is based upon a strict adherence to the rule of law.520
Even Ruth Gavison says, “Our Supreme Court is very impressive. All told, it
has excellent people, it enjoys a very strong status at home and high
professional prestige. We can all take pride in it.”521
Into the mix at this time, however, are thrown the variety of efforts
going forward to create a constitution for Israel; the effects of the recent
election; the continued divisions between the Orthodox and non-Orthodox
over the role of Jewish law; and the atrophying of the power of the Ashkenazi
elite. The Ashkenazi still control the instruments of the law, but they are a
beleaguered minority. 522
Americans reading this book, a book of a remarkable judge’s
philosophy of the role of the judicial branch, should be aware of the central
role the author has played in Israeli constitutionalism. Many Americans may
be wary of Barak’s expanded view of standing, abhor his disregard of the
concept of non-justiciability, and fear the restrictions on the government even
during times of terrorism. What Barak prescribes for the role of the judge in a
democracy may not inevitably lead to a profound accumulation of judicial
power. Instead, they are merely checks on the other branches of government,
ensuring that the fundamental values and principles that democratic societies
hold to such high regard are in fact promoted. While changes in an
established political system have the potential to cause a sense of instability,
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fear, and criticism, from Barak’s point of view “this modern development is
not to increase the power of the court in a democracy but rather to increase the
protection of democracy and human rights.”131
Jeffrey B. Morris and Shari G. Newman523
A Jury of Whose Peers? The Cultural Politics of Juries in Australia. Edited
by Kate Auty and Sandy Toussaint. Crawley, Western Australia: University
of Western Australia Press, 2004. Pp. ix, 174. ISBN 1-920694-17-X.
US$35.00
If the criminal courtroom were a stage (as indeed it so often has been
in pop culture), who would be the stars? The jury, according to Kate Auty
and Sandy Toussaint, editors of A Jury of Whose Peers?, a collection of seven
essays written by contributors running the gamut from academic to the
“average Joe.” The collection, which is subtitled The Cultural Politics of
Juries in Australia, puts the jury center stage in an attempt to examine the
culture of the courtroom as it is both created by and imposed upon the jury as
a discreet social body.
Auty and Touissant, a magistrate and an anthropologist respectively,
aim to place legal studies within the framework of “cultural studies.” The
goal is an interesting and an important one, but here, the editors have
sacrificed depth for breadth. The entire book, including notes and index, is a
slim 174 pages, only 122 of which are substantive text. In that short space,
seven authors cover such diverse topics as the emotional and practical
demands placed on jurors (chapter one) and barristers (chapter two), juror
competence (chapter three), the inequality of Australian aborigines (chapters
four and five) and battered woman syndrome (chapters six and seven).
The tones of the various chapters are also uneven, ranging from
humorous to passionate to academic. Indeed, the editors did this
intentionally, arguing that the shifting voices reflect the complexity and
ambiguity of the discussion. As a result, one of the central functions of
editing a collection - bringing together a multiplicity of perspectives around a
core theme to create a diverse yet coherent reading experience - is ignored.
Here, the only commonality between the essays is that they each mention
juries, but even that connection is tenuous. For example, the last two essays
on battered woman syndrome are chiefly critical of the way abused women
131
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are handled by the judicial system as a whole and barely mention what if any
role the jury plays in the dysfunction of that particular defense in the
Australian legal system.
Yet there are a few if not gems than at least semi-precious stones in
this collection. Indigenous writer and film-maker Richard Frankland’s piece
is a poignant personal exploration of the disconnection between the ideal of a
representative jury and the reality of continuing prejudice. Because of the
historical and continuing oppression of aboriginal communities in Australia,
Frankland painfully concludes, “No jury will ever be my peers.” Editor Kate
Auty’s piece takes up the historical half of this equation and is a thorough and
well-documented introduction to the legal treatment of Australian aborigines
over the past century. The discussions of battered woman syndrome are also
useful, particularly Jocelyn Scutt’s piece arguing that the misuse and
misinterpretation of the syndrome as its own defense, instead of as evidence
in determining the reasonableness element of ordinary self-defense harms,
abused women more than it helps them.
A Jury of Whose Peers? is well-edited and well-documented with
extensive citations for each chapter. It includes an excellent bibliography as
well as tables of other referenced sources such as archives, crown files and
government publications. It also includes a table of cases cited; however, the
usefulness of this feature is diminished by a lack of page number references.
Finally, it has a sparse index that, though not put together as carefully as one
would hope (novelist Toni Morrison who appears in two footnotes has her
own entry whereas criminal defendant Robyn Kina who was discussed
extensively in chapter 6 is nestled mysteriously under “Communications,
language issues”) is adequate for the book’s size.
Because of the spotty quality of some of the pieces in this collection,
it is not a recommended for smaller libraries or those with limited budgets.
However, for larger academic law libraries with significant international law
collections the best of the pieces in this book are worth having.
Tammy R. Pettinato
University of Michigan Law Library
Anna Arbor, MI USA
A Theory of International Terrorism: Understanding Islamic Militancy. By
L. Ali Khan. Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2006. Pp. xi,
371. ISBN 90-04-15207-5. €115.00; US$150.00.
L. Ali Khan is a law professor at Washburn University in Kansas. In
this book, Dr. Khan explains Islamic militancy using three case studies:
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Israel/Palestine, Chechnya, and Kashmir. Along the way, he discusses the
role of armed jihad from a standpoint of Islamic theology, “value
imperialism,” and how the very concept of the Nation State may undermine
satisfactory and peaceful solutions to the conflicts under study. Building on
his earlier books, The Extinction of Nation States (1996) and A Theory of
Universal Democracy (2003), he also proposes novel, long-term strategies to
resolve other intercultural political conflicts worldwide.
Part I of the book, dedicated to the phenomenology of terrorism,
describes a “terror triangle,” a schematic that shows how the Nation State,
born of violence, uses violence for its preservation. In the case of Chechnya,
the Chechens are an aggrieved indigenous population and Russia is the Nation
State that suppresses them. The third component of the triangle comprises the
various entities, States and non-State actors, that provide moral, financial, and
military support to the aggrieved population.
Part II is dedicated to the ontology of terrorism. Dr. Khan challenges
the assertion, most forcefully advanced by American neo-conservatives, that
Islam is inherently violence-prone, and that individual Muslims have been
programmed for violence by Islamic theology. He believes the militancy of
the Palestinians, Chechens, and Kashmiris arises from a set of concrete
grievances, and that militancy is in its turn continually fuelled by the State
violence employed by Israel, Russia, and India. He also believes the
militancy is stoked by value imperialism promulgated by the three
suppressive States; i.e. they attempt to impose their mores on the aggrieved
populations, and hence do not limit themselves to strict national security or
“law and order” agendas.
Dr. Khan discusses Islam’s Basic Code (the Qur’an plus the Sunnah,
the reflections and deeds of Prophet Muhammad) as it applies to resistance to
injustice and oppression. He describes the different types of resistance
allowed to observant Muslims, and thus tries to impart a moral basis to it. He
contrasts an essentially defensive Islamic resistance, which includes armed
resistance, with the predatory violence employed by the three State
adversaries. Dr. Khan sees this State-sanctioned counter-violence as amoral
in that it arises from base motives: economic interests, coveting territory, and
natural resources, or merely raison d’État. Moreover, he believes armed jihad
is justified under the jus ad bellum doctrine in the United Nations Charter, in
so much as the document enshrines the right to self-determination of peoples.
It is understandable that Dr. Khan, a devout Muslim, should make a
distinction between violence he sees as divinely sanctioned and other types of
violence. It is less clear why he adverts to the U.N. Charter, since that secular
document is the product of an international legal order that has not been
influenced by any of the five schools of Islamic jurisprudence he describes.
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Dr. Khan sees the United States as the globe’s principal suppressive
power, citing the country’s promiscuous use of its armed forces and its
ongoing attempts to impose its cultural norms on recalcitrant populations
worldwide. Some of his critiques of the United States are reminiscent of
those emanating from the European academic Left in the 1960s and 1970s,
e.g., the United States is a rapacious empire in search of global hegemony.
According to that interpretation, when the United States wasn’t incinerating
the world’s peoples with its napalm, it was exploiting them with its
multinational corporations, poisoning them with its fast food, and
brainwashing them with its movies and pop music. In Dr. Khan’s retelling,
American foreign policy no longer seems to be in thrall to domestic capital,
but is now a tool of Christian evangelicals and their neo-conservative allies,
who, when not waging war on Muslims or supporting those who are, seek to
defame them – before converting them.
If Dr. Khan’s analysis recalls one that is both secular and Western,
this is perhaps because he has spent much of his life in a secular West;
although of Pakistani origin, he received much of his post-graduate education
in the United States. He resembles in this way the Iranian sociologist Ali
Shariati, himself a product of the Sorbonne. Dr. Shariati worked diligently to
find Islamic solutions to the twin problems of (capitalist) liberalism and
(communist) materialism, but he leavened his writings with a dash of tiersmondisme on the Frantz Fanon model. (Dr. Shariati’s works helped inspire
the overthrow of the Shah, though this did not prevent the Iranian mullahs
from banning his books once they had assumed power.)
In Part III of the book, Dr. Khan proposes peaceful solutions to the
three conflicts under study, beginning with negotiated solutions. Because he
sees the militant groups fighting on behalf of the Palestinians, Chechens, and
Kashmiris as rational actors, he believes negotiating with them would not be
appeasement or a fool’s errand, but instead an equally rational act on the part
of the three implicated States. He adduces the Canadian federal government’s
success in negotiating an end to separatist violence committed by the Front de
libération du Québec in the 1960s and 1970s. That small, armed militant
group was brought into the political process, but Canada is a pacific country
with long traditions of consensus-building and constitutional legality to draw
upon. Ottawa’s inducing the Front to forswear violence may not be readily
transferable to other countries.
Indeed, peaceful solutions to postwar Europe’s three protracted,
violent separatist conflicts, in Ulster, the Basque country, and Corsica, have
remained elusive. Although the Irish Republican Army has, after a decade of
negotiations with successive British and Irish governments, renounced armed
struggle, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (“ETA”) and the Fronte di liberazione
naziunale di a Corsica have not, and negotiations with those groups on the
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part of various Spanish and French governments have yielded little of
permanence.
Moving to less politically mature countries, the results are also mixed.
In El Salvador, the insurgent Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front was
brought to the negotiating table and now participates in the electoral process.
In Peru, President Fujimori unleashed the army on the Shining Path, deciding
that the group’s political program – a seeming desire to turn the country into
an Andean version of Pol Pot’s Cambodia – precluded a peaceful, negotiated
outcome. Although these two armed movements were not separatist in
character, they ventured to speak on behalf of aggrieved populations.
Perhaps in assessing the prospects for success when negotiating with
a militant group, it is important to consider the group’s political program and
the psychological profile of its leadership. If for instance the Israelis believe
Hamas to be closer in spirit to the Front de libération du Québec than to the
Shining Path, then there is hope for a successful negotiated settlement.
Ultimately, Dr. Khan sees the Nation State per se as the principal
impediment to peaceful solutions. Because Nation States guard their
sovereignty so assiduously, they are loath to offer autonomy, let alone
independence, to aggrieved populations. As a long-term option, Dr. Khan
proposes that Free States supplant Nation States. The Free State has an
administrative function, but no sovereignty, and he cites the status of the
states of the United States, or the Member States of the European Union. This
is a novel approach, but it is unclear how a Free State could function without
some controlling legal authority. In the United States, all local laws and
ordinances are subject to (federal) constitutional challenge; in the E.U., laws
enacted at European level actually supersede national legislation.
If Israel/Palestine were to become such a polity, what legal regime
could be implemented to satisfy all citizens? Gay rights legislation would
almost assuredly be repugnant to devout Muslims. And would liberals,
whether religious or secular, tolerate a law requiring unmarried women be
accompanied by male relatives when in public? The notion of the Free State
is made yet more complicated by Dr. Khan’s contention elsewhere in the book
that Muslims do not wish to live under any legal regime that posits a
separation of secular and sacred authority. He may have suggested how to
square this circle in his previous books, but it would have been helpful to
readers of this one had he added one or two expositive paragraphs.
Dr. Khan concedes that Free States seem utopian, and he is aware that
they may never be realized. In his defense, one should recognize that the
origins of the Nation State are largely traceable to a specific time and place,
viz. Europe under absolutism. There is no reason to suppose that the current
international order shall forever endure.
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At times in the book, Dr. Khan lapses into polemics, though his
analysis is otherwise dispassionate, as befits a legal scholar. And although
Dr. Khan is not an elegant writer, he is an engaging one, and his text is
mercifully free of academic jargon. However, this book – qua book – is
disappointing because the reader is subjected to many syntactical defects,
stylistic incongruities, typographical mistakes and misspellings. Martinus
Nĳhoff is among the world’s top-tier legal publishers, and recently became an
imprint of Brill, a publishing house founded in 1683 and the holder of a Dutch
royal warrant. That Dr. Khan submitted his manuscript to Nĳhoff editors in
less than perfect condition is forgivable; that those editors approved this book
for publication in its present state is not.
524

Scott Rasmussen
Sausalito, CA USA

Liberal Reform in an Illiberal Regime: The Creation of Private Property in
Russia, 1906-1915. By Stephen F. Williams. Stanford, CA: Hoover
Institution Press, 2006. Pp. xii, 320. ISBN 0-8179-4722-1. US$15
(paperback).
Stephen Williams’ Liberal Reform in an Illiberal Regime is a
welcoming addition to the historiography of land reform in the late imperial
Russia. This book contributes to the ongoing discussion of whether the
reform destroyed the commune as a traditional form of agricultural and
political organization for Russian peasants or led to enhancing peasant
productivity and fostering a bourgeois ethic among the peasantry. The author
stands firmly with the champions of the reform. He recognizes the genuine
role, effectiveness, and validity of a liberal reform initiated and implemented
from above by a government that was neither liberal nor democratic, although
he perfectly understands the systemic pitfalls and difficulties faced by the
reformers.
Unlike the existing voluminous literature on this subject, which is
focused mostly on the explanation of the reform, review of its preconditions,
and evaluation of its consequences, this book is dedicated to another aspect of
the land reform. Williams examines the impact that the reform had on the
development of property rights in Russia and to what degree the changes in
the property rights system influenced the general liberalization of Russian
society. A biographical sketch of Prime Minister Stolypin and a review of
discussions regarding Stolypin’s policy in the Russian Duma and State
524
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Council allow for a better understanding of the problems encountered during
the course of the reform.
The structure of this book reflects the logic of a judge, which the
author as a judge applies every day in his courtroom. Williams evaluates the
facts, reviews the situation in Russian agriculture, analyzes the context of the
reform, looks at the pre-existing property rights regime, examines how and
why the reform was developed, evaluates the arguments of the reform’s
opponents and proponents, explores peasant conditions before the reform,
studies alternative options to the reform, and only after that does he resolve
the main question regarding the role of private land ownership in the conflict
between the end state of liberal democracy and the interests of those who hold
power in an illiberal state.
The book relies heavily on the available statistics of the period,
analysis of legislation, and factual information provided by Western and
Russian historical studies. Critical analysis of the source materials, which
include mostly Russian government publications and papers issued by party
factions in the Duma, adds credibility to the research. Special credit should
be given to Williams for thoughtful selection of maps and charts, which
enhance and visualize one’s understanding of the reform, as well as for the
proper selection of terms in the glossary. The statutory appendix, which
includes excerpts from all major legal acts relevant to the reform translated
into English, allows one to understand the language of law and compare one’s
own conclusions with the author’s opinion. An impressive bibliography
reaffirms the author’s reputation as a noted scholar.
The book starts with the general analysis of property rights and the
role they play in civil society and liberal democracy. The first chapter focuses
on specifics of property relations in early 20th century Russia. Williams
acknowledges that collectivized rights of peasant allotment land seriously
conflicted with liberalism and offered less opportunity for individual initiative
when compared with individual ownership. He presents the opinions of major
political forces in the country on this issue by exposing their lack of
preparation to support the peasant acquisition of real property rights and their
approach toward the reform and personally toward Stolypin, whose
appointment as Prime Minister coincided with the dissolution of the First
State Duma, another legal and political barrier on the way to liberal
democracy in the country.
The second chapter discusses the preexisting property rights regime
and its dysfunction. Williams analyzes the essence of the “repartitional”
commune, which was the prevailing form of land ownership, and reviews its
specifics, such as open fields, number of plots held by peasants, distance
traveled between the village and remote tracts, decision making processes
within the commune, tax burden assignments, and communal sociology. He
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concludes that up to the time of the Stolypin reform restrictive laws, high
transaction costs, and policies of the communes’ elders made ending
repartition and consolidating tracts a very complicated issue, even though the
redemption obligations were cancelled in 1905. The third chapter looks at
peasant conditions just before the adoption of the reform. This study appears
to be very useful for comparing the reform to other proposed solutions to the
“agrarian problem.” This chapter contains a wealth of numerical information,
which sometimes complicates the truly exciting reading about the daily life of
Russian peasant families, their personal expenditures, activities on the grain
market, and relations with the Land Bank. However, these figures do provide
an excellent documentary illustration to the text.
Chapter 4 shows how strong the opposition to the reform was.
Williams describes the composition of the First State Duma and the conflict
between the government and the elected representatives regarding the agrarian
reform. Williams states that the government viewed the reform as part of an
effort to build a rule of law state and an opportunity to avoid revolution. The
positions of the forces that confronted the government (landowners, peasant
representatives in the Duma, members of the dominating Constitutional
Democratic Party) and alternative projects are analyzed in this chapter. This
analysis allows the reader to understand better the depth of the conflict in
which no social or political force could insist on its vision of the reform and
comprehend legal maneuvering aimed at adopting reform legislation through
the application of the Tsar’s “executive privilege” to pass emergency laws
during the Duma’s recess. The property rights reform initiated by Stolypin
was just one part, although a fundamental one, of the agrarian reform in the
late 19th and early 20th century Russia. The collateral measures included,
among others, the reduction of the term of conscription, phasing out of the
poll tax, elimination of peasants’ collective responsibility for land taxes and
redemption dues, cancellation of debts on redemption payments, and
elimination of many other disabilities restricting peasants’ ability to divide
property, undertake obligations, participate in civil service, and obtain higher
education. The investigation of how the government proceeded with these
and other measures makes this book unique because no other research paints
such a comprehensive picture of government efforts to make the reform
succeed.
Chapter 5 is a rather technical but necessary chapter. It describes the
core reform policies and the choices given to individual peasants and
communes. It also evaluates the immediate effects of the reform and
examines the variations in the reform implementation by region and size of
peasant landholdings. This part of the chapter is of special interest because it
allows one to see how the reform’s results varied in neighboring and
relatively similar provinces, such as Kursk and Voronezh, or Tula and
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Ryazan. Endless discussions about the purpose of the reform, its forceful
implementation, and other reform design issues continued for the entire
century since the reform was introduced. The reform critics did not change
their arguments and accused Stolypin of destroying the commune as a
possible source of organized political resistance to the regime and of
weakening the peasants politically by setting them at odds with one another.
In regard to the issue of application of force, Williams proves that the official
abuses of power were not endorsed or encouraged by central authorities and
had nothing to do with the reform specifically. After reviewing peasants’
complaints, Williams concludes that the violations can be attributed to the
Russian reality and could happen in the course of any government campaign.
In response to accusations of intentional diminution of peasants’ political
strength, Williams demonstrates how improved incentives and title conversion
easily secured immediate gains in productivity, which for the majority of the
peasants was of bigger importance rather than participation in political
discussions. Of interest is the statistical data on land consolidation and
harvest growth that debunks implications that the authorities did not care
about productivity or peasant preference. The mistakes, flaws, and
incompleteness of the reform are studied as well, and add to the objectivity of
the analysis in chapter 6. This careful detailing of the difficult balancing is
one of the strengths of the book.
In the last chapter of the book, Williams describes property rights as
the key factor in assessing legal arrangements and their effects on the ability
of political actors to resolve social conflicts and improve institutional
efficiency. He recognizes the following long-term implications of the reform:
growth in agricultural productivity and peasant welfare, social transformation
of Russian rural population, exploration of new lands in Siberia and Central
Asia, strengthening property rights, and creation of prospects for a liberal
democracy in Russia. The book ends with a concise examination of current
efforts of Russian reformers to introduce markets and property rights into the
post-communist agricultural system. Williams draws an analogy between the
Stolypin era and today based on the facts that, as in the past, some individuals
favoring liberal reforms are at least nominally close to the core of power in
present-day Russia, and the same questions about the necessity to secure the
pillars of liberal democracy, which were raised in 1906, remain acute today.
Overall, Williams has produced a well-written, easy-to-read book on
a very complex subject. His work will be of interest to students of property
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and land relations in pre-revolutionary Russia. The book would also be useful
for graduate and advanced undergraduate students interested in Russian late
imperial history.
Peter Roudik
Senior Foreign Law Specialist
Law Library of Congress
Washington, D.C. USA

State Practice Regarding State Immunities/La Pratique des Etats
concernant les Immunités des Etats. Edited by Gerhard Hafner, Marcelo G.
Kohen, and Susan Breau. Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV,
2006. Pp. viii, 1502. ISBN 90-04-15073-0. €295.00; US$398.00.
In 2002, the Council of Europe (COE) launched a Pilot Project on
State Practice Regarding State Immunities. The project aimed to clarify
practice by European States and to collect materials exemplifying that
practice. As part of the Pilot Project, the COE has made summaries of State
practice documents, submitted by its member states, available in a database.525
These State practice documents include national court decisions, national
legislation, and other materials. They address areas such as waiver of
immunity, employment contracts, personal injury and damage to State
property, and the effect of arbitration agreements.
The COE engaged three organizations to prepare a joint study of State
practice in this area: The Department of European, International, and
Comparative Law of the University of Vienna; the Graduate Institute of
International Studies, Geneva; and the British Institute of International and
Comparative Law. Gerhard Hafner and his co-editors, Susan Breau and
Marcelo Kohen, recruited additional scholars to write ten analytical chapters,
which comprise Part I of the book.
In these chapters, the authors combine thorough dissection of State
practice with comparisons to the provisions of three instruments: the UN
Convention, the unsuccessful 1972 European Convention on State
Immunity,526 and, to a lesser extent, the 1991 International Law Commission
(ILC) Draft Articles for a Convention on State Immunity. These chapter
contributions are uniformly excellent. Each author manages to bring clarity to
525
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526
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an aspect of State immunities, from Kohen’s helpful treatment of the
definition of “State” to August Reinisch’s well-organized explanation of
immunity from enforcement measures.527 Stephan Wittich marshals a large
body of case law into a coherent statement of the commercial transaction
exception. Kohen expertly unravels the two threads of diplomatic immunity
and State immunity from a knotty mass of unclear case law and state practice.
Unlike some academicians, the authors state their conclusions without
endless qualifications, giving the reader a clear sense of the prevailing rules.
The authors do not restrict their discussion to the examples of State practice
summarized in Part II of the book. Instead, they provide extensive discussion
of, and references to, legal authorities from many jurisdictions.
Part II of the book includes the summaries of State practice
documents available in the COE database. More importantly, it includes
Susan Breau’s masterful digest of practice by Council of Europe members,
organized under the main headings of jurisdictional immunity, immunity from
execution, and waiver. Subheadings, arranged according to the articles of the
UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property,528
allow easy access to summaries of decisions on topics such as employment
contracts, intellectual property, and commercial transactions.
For researchers seeking clarity on other aspects of State immunities,
this book will be an invaluable resource. I recommend this book to State
officials, national judges, scholars, and practitioners engaged in business
relations with foreign States.
Finally, a note on language. The book’s essays, including Susan
Breau’s extensive digest of State practice on immunities within the Council of
Europe, appear both in English and French, on facing pages, identically
numbered. In the English-language version of the essays, French quotations
from judicial opinions have not been translated into English. On the French
side, the occasional excerpt from English-language statutes and cases has
been ably rendered in French. The “National Contributions” from Andorra,
Belgium, France, Switzerland, and Turkey appear only in French; the
remaining 23 contributions are in English.
Mary Rumsey
Foreign, Comparative & International Law Librarian
University of Minnesota Law Library
Minneapolis, MN USA
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Practice and Policies of Modern Peace Support Operations Under
International Law (International and Comparative Criminal Law Series).
Edited by Roberta Arnold and Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops. Ardsley, New
York: Transnational Publishers, 2006. Pp. vii, 303. ISBN 1-57105-361-1.
US$125.00.
According to a recent United Nations press release, UN peacekeeping
deployments reached record levels in 2006 with over 80 thousand military and
police personnel serving in 18 peacekeeping operations throughout the
world.1 As the most immediate and effective method available to the UN for
maintaining international peace and security, UN peacekeeping operations
have undergone a dramatic transformation over the past twenty years. The
Security Council, freed from the constraints of Cold War politics, has
expanded the scope of its operations to contain regional and internal conflicts
throughout the world. In his book, Council Unbound: the Growth of UN
Decision Making on Conflict and Postconflict Issues after the Cold War2,
Michael J. Matheson identifies three distinct “generations” of UN
peacekeeping that illustrate this evolution and accretion of responsibilities.
The first generation, most prevalent during the Cold War era, was the classic
formulation of a light military force inserted into a conflict with the consent of
the combatants and tasked with a limited mission of providing a buffer
between belligerents, thus allowing for a cessation of hostilities. UN
operations in the Sinai and the Golan Heights are typical of this type of
operation. Second generation peacekeeping operations, on the other hand,
were constituted in reaction to complex emergencies and were typically in
response to an internal conflict requiring a response utilizing not only
traditional military functions, but also requiring reconstruction of key
economic and political institutions, and humanitarian assistance to noncombatants. Peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Croatia and Haiti are
representative of this more robust formulation. Finally, UN peacekeeping has
entered a third stage where, unlike earlier operations, military personnel are
inserted into “failed state” situations and assume all governing functions in
the territory until such activities can be returned to a reconstituted domestic
government. The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia in 1991 represents
the first major foray of the UN into this type of mission. Thus, peace support
1
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Matheson, Michael. Council Unbound: the Growth of UN Decision Making on
Conflict and Postconflict Issues after the Cold, United States Institute of Peace Press
(2006).
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operations have evolved from simple peace enforcement and management
tasks to that of complex international crisis response and management
operations typically involving institution building, law enforcement, and
humanitarian crisis management.
Given this dramatic transformation of peace support missions, a
timely new collection of essays, Practice and Policies of Modern Peace
Support Operations Under International Law, attempts to define and
delineate the emerging parameters of this new paradigm. This volume, the
latest in Transnational’s International and Comparative Criminal Law Series,
offers a detailed and multi-faceted perspective on the practice and policies of
modern peace support operations. As the editors state in their introduction,
the main focus of the book is on evaluating modern peace support operations
“in action,” and distilling the lessons learned from earlier experiences for the
benefit of future operations. Thus, Part 1 of the collection takes a historical
look at peace support operations generally, outlines their use in establishing
and promoting rule of law, and presents the challenges they face in creating
effective and legitimate post-conflict civil institutions and judicial
mechanisms to punish war criminals and establish order. The section
concludes with Gerhard Scherhaufer’s essay detailing the experiences of
Austria’s deployment with the Kosovo Force (KFOR), which neatly illustrates
the wide range of legal issues faced by a deploying force and the complex
interplay between political and military goals and their ultimate
implementation on the ground during a mission.
Part 2 of the collection looks at the relationship of international law
norms to modern peace support operations. Co-author Roberta Arnold
evaluates the applicability of the Geneva Conventions and the law of
occupation to such operations and concludes that peacekeepers are indirectly
bound by humanitarian law through their membership in their individual
national armies. Josephine Lett next examines the issues surrounding the
extraterritorial reach of the European Convention of Human Rights to
international peacekeeping operations. Do individuals of non-member states
enjoy the protections of the Convention when their territory is occupied by
forces of member states? Lett comes to the conclusion that the instrument
may very well travel with the troops and in certain circumstances can be
invoked by individuals in the deployment area. Part II concludes with
chapters on the necessity of effective status of force agreements for the
protection of peacekeeping forces and the efficacy of the use of non-lethal
weapons. Both essays serve to illuminate and underscore the hard-learned
lessons of past deployments and their applicability to improving future
operations.
Part 3 concludes the volume by looking at the interrelationship of
peace support operations and international criminal law. Co-editor Geert-Jan
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Alexander Knoops examines the complex issues surrounding the liability of
peacekeeping forces to military criminal sanctions and makes
recommendations for reconciling conflicting domestic and international
norms. Stefano Failla discusses the issue of border control during a peace
support operation using the Kosovo deployment of 1999-2005 as a case in
point. The necessity of re-establishing cross-border commercial activity and
the orderly migration and repatriation of displaced persons is crucial to the
success of such operations and cannot be neglected. Pascal M. Dupont
discusses the issue of criminal detention, again using the Kosovo crisis as an
example. He highlights the need for monitoring mechanisms for such
detentions by the international community during such an operation. Finally,
this section concludes with a glimpse of the dark side of past peacekeeping
deployments and the potential for criminal activity. Specifically, authors
Valerie Wahl and Sandra Katrin Miller look at the trafficking of human
beings for the purposes of sexual exploitation that occurred during
deployments in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Congo. They outline the legal
options available for curtailing such illicit trafficking and the need for
establishing effective disciplinary mechanisms and standards for prosecuting
peacekeepers and support personnel suspected of participating in such
activities.
On the whole, Practice and Policies of Modern Peace Support
Operations provides a comprehensive overview of the complex
responsibilities and challenges inherent in modern day peace support
operations, and as such it is a welcome contribution to the literature. It is
unique in that the contributors go beyond the theoretical underpinnings of the
subject by evaluating past operations and using them as predictors for future
refinements. The collection’s detailed treatment of the topic allows it to serve
both as an introductory primer to the topic as well as a detailed guidebook to
the many important issues to be considered when evaluating and planning
such operations. Readers will also appreciate the detailed index and table of
cases that allow one to locate needed subject matter quickly. Practice and
Policies of Modern Peace Support Operations is a valuable addition to any
comprehensive collection of literature on international peacekeeping and is
also highly recommended to anyone interested in the ability of the
international community to alleviate human rights violations through
humanitarian intervention.
Herb Somers
Foreign/International Law Librarian
Jacob Burns Law Library
The George Washington University Law School
Washington, D.C. USA

